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What is Metascientific Ontology?
François Maurice1
RESUME — L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques
par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontolo-
giques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élabora-
tion d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que
leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne dif-
fèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’on-
tologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche
pas à représenter des objets étrangers au monde que nous habitons et aux
sciences qui l’étudient, et par conséquent elle n’a pas besoin de facultés ni de mé-
thodes spéciales pour mener à bien ses recherches. L’ontologie métascientifique
est un discours général scientifique sur le monde parce que conçue par et pour les
sciences.
ABSTRACT — Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its ob-
jectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of
Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the
world as known through the sciences, their objects of study are scientific concepts,
and their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational
activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not
seek to represent objects alien to the world we inhabit and to the sciences that
study it, and therefore does not need special faculties and methods to carry out its
research. Metascientific ontology is a general scientific discourse on the world be-
cause it was designed by and for the sciences.
1 Graduated in social statistics, mathematics and philosophy, independent researcher, founder of the So-
ciety for the Progress of Metasciences and translator in French of the Philosophical Dictionary by Mario
Bunge published at Éditions Matériologiques under the title Dictionnaire Philosophique.
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We continue our characterization of metascience that we have undertaken in
our article Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse (Maurice 2020). In or-
der to better understand the nature of metascience, and thus to better under-
stand what distinguishes it from philosophy, we will compare metascientific on-
tology to philosophical ontology. Since we argue in the just-mentioned article
that Bunge’s philosophical theories are in fact metascientific theories, we will
use Bunge’s ontology to make this comparison.
We will therefore examine the ontological theories as set out in Bunge’s writ-
ings, particularly those found in volumes 3 and 4 of the Treatise on Basic Philos-
ophy. This presentation will clearly highlight the non-philosophical nature of
Bunge’s theories, notably by his refusal to postulate the existence of objects or
entities other than those postulated and studied by science and his rejection of
philosophical methods.
In several texts Bunge has attempted to define or characterize metaphysics
or scientific ontology2. In general, Bunge considers that ontology and metaphys-
ics are synonymous, just as scientific ontology and scientific metaphysics are
synonymous, although Bunge leans towards the use of the second expression
before 1977 and for the use of the first since 1977. It should be noted, however,
that we should not confuse scientific ontology as characterized by Bunge or by
other philosophers with metascientific ontology as we will characterize it from
Bunge’s practice, although in the end, that is, once we no longer refer to Bunge’s
conceptions or those of philosophers, we consider the two expressions to be syn-
onymous. In fact, if we refer to a strictly metascientific framework, we can speak
of ontology only. In the end, what interests us is to succeed in showing that
2 Bunge’s five main texts that deal with the nature of scientific ontology are: an article with the explicit
title “Is Scientific Metaphysics Possible?”, 1971, chapter two of Method, Model and Matter entitled “Testa-
bility Today”, 1973, a text in French entitled “Les présupposés et les produits métaphysiques de la science
et de la technique contemporaines”, 1974, an article that proposes a typology of scientific theories entitled
“The GST Challenge to the Classical Philosophies of Science”, 1977, and the introduction of Ontology: The
Furniture of the World, volume 3 of the Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 1977.
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scientific or metascientific ontology as we conceive it differs from any philosoph-
ical ontology.
As scientific ontology, scientific metaphysics is used not only by Bunge but
also by some philosophers. For our purposes, let us only note that we have re-
defined metaphysics as the metascience of physics, in the same way that there is
metachemistry, metabiology and metapsychonology3. For us, ontology and met-
aphysics are not synonymous, although this is for reasons different from those
advanced by philosophers who see a difference between ontology and metasci-
ence.
Finally, the expression scientific philosophy is a contradiction in terms. Our
appreciation of philosophy as a transcendent general discourse does not allow it
to be scientific (Maurice 2020). The non-scientificity of philosophy will become
clearer once Bunge’s metascientific ontology is exposed as an illustration of a
scientific general discourse.
In this article, we are interested in the objects of study (referents) of the on-
tological theories exposed in volumes 3 and 4 of the Treatise. We therefore leave
aside the form these theories can take or their formalism, the use that can be
made of them or their implementation, and how these theories can be evaluated
or their testability. We will also leave aside the Bungean thesis according to
which abstract scientific theories, such as Lagrangian dynamics, and systems
theories, such as cybernetics or the theory of automata, are ontological theories.
In particular, Bunge argues that there is no boundary between factual science
and ontology, that there is a continuity that runs from the most particular factual
sciences to the most general ontologies: “A complete ontology should include
both universal and regional ontological theories. The former serve as frame-
works for the latter, which will in turn illustrate and in a way test the former.”
(Bunge 1977, 3:11). Thus, in philosophical jargon, Bunge argues for a form of
naturalization of ontology. We will not examine this thesis of the continuity be-
tween factual science and ontology, but our results rather indicate a dichotomy
between the two disciplinary fields. Note that Bunge does not defend the idea of
continuity between factual science and mathematics. On the contrary, he postu-
lates a dichotomy between factual proposition and formal proposition. In addi-
tion to the referents of ontological theories, we will focus on the methods, tech-
niques and tools used by Bunge to build these theories. We will then see that
3 We group under psychonology all the disciplines that deal with humans on the basis of the existence of
a fourth level of organization of matter, thinking matter, in the same way that there is a physical, chemical
and living matter (Maurice 2020).
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Bunge does not appeal to any approach associated with philosophical doctrines.
In short, we will follow Bunge’s advice:
When in doubt about the authenticity of an intellectual endeavor, the right
thing to do is to perform a candorous (sic) reexamination of its three com-
ponents: subject matter, method, and goal. (Bunge 1973, 1)
In the case which interests us, i.e. the nature of Bungean ontology, we will
examine the ontological theories set out in volumes 3 and 4 of the Treatise de-
voted to their development: Ontology I: The Furniture of the World and Ontology
II: A World of Systems. Specifically, for the task ahead, we need to look only at
chapters 3 to 6 of Ontology I and Chapter 1 of Ontology II. Why this restriction of
our field of investigation? Our aim is to show 1) that the Bungean ontology does
not postulate the existence of any particular object, but takes for granted the ex-
istence of the objects studied by the factual sciences, and 2) that the methods,
techniques and cognitive faculties used to achieve this are those that one would
expect to find in all rational activities, be it scientific research, management, law,
etc. The chapters mentioned above expose the fundamental concept of Bungean
ontology, the concrete object4. In fact, the Bunge system is designed to account
for the concrete object in the light of science. Whether it is semantics, epistemol-
ogy, methodology or ontology, it is always the concrete object that is discussed
because factual sciences study only concrete objects. If an examination of the
central concept of Bungean thought reveals no transcendence, it is implausible
to find it in any other places in Bunge’s work.
We can divide these two volumes into six distinct moments. Chapters 1 and
2 of Ontology I serve to introduce the notions of substantial individual and sub-
stantial property respectively. These concepts are used in Chapter 3 to define the
concepts of concrete object and totality of concrete objects (Sect. 1.1). Chapter 3
also puts forward two postulates, the ontological one of the existence of concrete
objects (section 1.2) and the methodological one of the dichotomy between con-
crete and conceptual objects (section 1.3). Once these two definitions and these
two postulates are in place, Bunge is able to introduce a large number of onto-
logical notions (while appealing to semantic, epistemological and methodologi-
cal considerations), which goes from section 1.4 of chapter 3 up to Chapter 6, the
4 See in this issue Martín Orensanz’s article, Bunge and Harman on the General Theory of Objects, for the
general notion of object, and not just that of concrete object. See also in this issue the article by Lukya-
nenko, Storey and Pastor, Foundations of Information Technology Based on Bunge’s Systemist Philosophy
of Reality, for a defense of the idea that the notion of concrete system is increasingly replacing that of
concrete object in Bunge’s writings following the Treatise.
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last chapter of Ontology I. In Chapter 1 of Ontology II, the very first definition is
that of a concrete system, defined using the notion of concrete object, just as for
the ontological concepts of Ontology I. Subsequently, and from the second defi-
nition, it is this notion of concrete system which takes center stage, and which
will play as important a role in Ontology II as the role played by the notion of
concrete object in Ontology. I. Chapters 2 to 5 of Ontology II are then devoted to
the study of concrete chemical, biological, psychological, and social systems5. Fi-
nally, chapter 6, the last chapter of Ontology II, generalizes some results concern-
ing concrete systems.
1 GOALS OF ONTOLOGY
Bunge has stated the objectives of ontology in several places and these objec-
tives are diverse because they relate to certain theses as to the nature of ontol-
ogy which we briefly discussed in the introduction6. For our purpose, which is
to show that Bunge’s general discourse is not philosophical, we restrict our
study to the main objectives that remain even if we reject the thesis of the con-
tinuity between science and ontology. If we stick to the introduction of Ontology
I of the Treatise, we find the following objectives of interest to us:
[…] the ontologist should stake out the main traits of the real world as
known through science, and that he should proceed in a clear and system-
atic way. He should recognize, analyze and interrelate those concepts ena-
bling him to produce a unified picture of reality. (The word “reality” is here
understood in a strict and non-Platonic sense, namely as the concrete
world.) (Bunge 1977, 3:5)
We take factual (natural or social) science and ontology to be the only dis-
ciplines concerned with concrete objects. And we assign ontology the task
of constructing the most general theories concerning such and only such
objects. (Bunge 1977, 3:6)
5 In other words, Bunge offers some elements of ontology of what we have called metachemistry, metabi-
ology, metapsychology and metasociology (there is also semantics, epistemology and methodology of
metachemistry, etc.) (Maurice 2020). There is no chapter on physical systems (a chapter of metaphysics
in the metascientific sense) in Ontology II because, according to Bunge, they are the best known of all and
he covered these systems in Ontology I (Bunge 1977, 3:45). Technically, Bunge’s second claim is wrong
since he dealt with the notion of concrete object in Ontology I and not that of physical system.
6 See note 2 for a list of Bunge’s texts discussing the nature of ontology.
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If we summarize, ontology produces general theories of concrete objects by
studying and generalizing the characteristics of these objects as known to sci-
ence in order to arrive at a unified conception of reality7. These general traits or
ontological categories are, for example, those of property, law, possibility and
change.
The objectives of Bungean ontology thus stated include in filigree the objects
of study as well as the legitimate methods of this ontology. The notion of con-
crete object is at the heart of Bungean ontology. It is this notion that will be the
subject of a theorization developed in Ontology I. Almost all ontological notions
relate to the concrete object. But the definitions and assumptions concerning the
concrete object are fed by the knowledge of the concrete objects studied by the
physical, chemical, biological, psychological and sociological sciences. There is
therefore a back-and-forth between scientific results or constructs, which are
analysed and interpreted, and the construction or synthesis of the concrete ob-
ject. Thus, the study of scientific results, and not the concrete objects themselves,
justifies conceiving metascience as distinct from factual sciences and made up of
conceptual sciences, forming a triad with factual sciences and formal sciences
(Maurice 2020).
We will therefore examine in more detail in the next two sections the objects
of study and the methods of Bungean ontology.
2 OBJECTS OF ONTOLOGY
The notion of concrete or material object of chapter 3 of Ontology I is defined in
a formal and complex way. Bunge needs a theory of substance (Chapter 1) and a
theory of form (Chapter 2) to arrive at a definition of the concrete object. We will
not examine these two theories and adopt a more intuitive characterization of
the concrete object proposed by Bunge himself, which will suffice for our pur-
poses (Bunge 1977, 3:240; 2000). The concrete object is the object susceptible
of change. But since change is impossible without energy or without a transfer
of energy, the concrete object is the object endowed with energy. This definition
justifies the postulate, still in chapter 3 of Ontology I, of the dichotomy between
concrete objects (things) and conceptual objects (constructs). Concepts,
7 Even if for Bunge the ultimate outcome of any research is a theory, a hypothetico-deductive system, he
is aware that many of the results presented in Ontology I and II are not strictly speaking theories. He
therefore introduces the notion of ontological framework, a construct which is situated between a set of
ideas that are not very closely related to each other and a hypothetico-deductive system, i.e. a theory
(Bunge 1977, 3:11–12).
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propositions, theories and formal objects of logic and mathematics are not en-
dowed with energy, are therefore not susceptible to change, and therefore have
no concrete, material or real existence.
It should be noted that the definition of a concept is not proof of the existence
of the object to which the concept refers. Thus, in Chapter 3 of Ontology I, we saw
that there is the definition of the concrete object, but also the postulate of the
existence of concrete objects8. Thus, Bunge takes for granted the existence of
concrete objects although he theorizes about them. Moreover, for Bunge, the cri-
teria and demonstrations of the existence of particular concrete objects such as
atoms, living cells or social groups are not a matter of ontology but of factual
sciences (we will come back to this later). Bunge therefore does not attempt, in
Ontology I: The Furniture of the World, to determine the “furniture of the world”
if by furniture of the world we mean the particular objects studied by the factual
sciences:
What is there?—we shall abstain from answering it. That is, we shall not list
the kinds of constituent of the world but shall leave the task to the special
sciences. For, no sooner does the metaphysician pronounce the world to
be “made of” such and such kinds, than the scientist discovers either that
some of the alleged species are empty or that others are missing in the
metaphysician’s list. (Bunge 1977, 3:153)
We can, however, understand “furniture of the world” in a general sense. At
this time, conceptual objects to which ontological concepts refer are seen as the
furniture of the world. But, in the world there are no general concrete objects,
no general properties or laws, no general states or events, no general processes
or changes. All that exists are particular objects, endowed with their particular
properties, in particular nomic interaction: “The real thing is the substantial in-
dividual with all its intrinsic and mutual properties. Everything else is fiction.”
(Bunge 1977, 3:101). Or, in a lapidary fashion: “To be, to exist really, is to be a
thing.” (Bunge 1977, 3:158). Or:
[…] all things, and only things, possess the property of existing really—a
property represented by 𝐸𝛩. This vindicates Aristotle’s principle that real
existence is singular. There are no general things: every real existent is an
individual. (Therefore “general systems theory” is a misnomer for “general
theory of systems”.) Whatever is general is either a property (e.g. a law) or
8 Likewise, change (Bunge 1977, 3:261) and energy (Bunge 1977, 3:240) as phenomena are taken for
granted, although these notions are theorized in Chapter 5 of Ontology I.
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an attribute (in which case it may be called a universal) or a proposition or
a set of propositions (e.g. a theory). (Bunge 1977, 3:157; italics in the origi-
nal)
We construct a general concept of the notion of concrete object, property,
state, event, process, and change. Without these general concepts, often used im-
plicitly, any theorization, even in the factual sciences, would be impossible. It is
for this reason that there are metascientific concepts inherent in science mistak-
enly equated with philosophical concepts. In other words, we need general con-
cepts to represent the world to us and to communicate, but these concepts do
not refer to particular real objects; they are the result of abstraction and gener-
alization.
Thus, Bunge postulates the existence of concrete objects and puts forward
several reasons to justify such an assumption, of which here is one:
Another reason for having to postulate the existence of things is that, if we
want to prove anything about existents, we must posit them. We cannot
prove the existence of concrete things any more than we can prove the
existence of deities or of disembodied minds. What can be proved is that,
unless there were things, other items—such as acting on them and investi-
gating them—would be impossible. (Bunge 1977, 3:112)
A demonstration or logical proof of existence is impossible. It is through re-
flection, experience, and knowledge that we can convince ourselves of the exist-
ence of the world and the concrete objects that form it. And much of this reflec-
tion, experience and knowledge are fueled by science. More precisely, we cannot
demonstrate the existence of the general concrete object because it does not ex-
ist. Only the existence of a particular concrete object postulated by the factual
sciences can be the subject of empirical proof (in fact, it suffices to find only one):
Our theory of things supplies no criterion for either establishing or refuting
any hypothesis to the effect that such and such an object really exists. It is
not the business of metaphysics to offer existence criteria […]. (Bunge 1977,
3:160)
Or,
Metaphysics, on the other hand, is hardly in a position to admit or rule out
any fact. What metaphysics can do is to clarify some of the concepts
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involved in scientific judgments of possibility or impossibility. (Bunge 1977,
3:178)
Thus, an essential notion in Bunge is that of a concrete object or thing. Concrete
objects are objects susceptible to change because they are endowed with energy.
In contrast, we find conceptual objects or constructs. These are not subject to
change because they do not have energy. Are we then in the presence of an on-
tological duality? No, since one of the axioms of the Bungean system is that only
concrete objects exist. The duality is therefore methodological and indeed nec-
essary to allow us to treat fictions or constructs as if these constructs were au-
tonomous. But this necessary methodological duality is often perceived by the
mind as an ontological duality (Maurice 2020).
Among concrete objects, we have, for example, objects commonly considered
concrete, such as a stone, but also objects whose concreteness is not immedi-
ately apparent, such as a quantum object, a physical field, a simple substance, a
chemical compound, a living organism, a family, a business. Thus, the meaning
of “concrete” in Bunge has a much broader scope than that of common sense or
even that of philosophy. Again, anything that has energy, and therefore suscep-
tible to change, is a concrete object.
Among the conceptual objects, there are objects of logic and mathematics, but
also any construct which refers to concrete objects or represents them, whether
this construct has a well-defined logical or mathematical form. Thus, functions
and mathematical sets are constructs, but also the concept of metabolism, which
should not be confused with the concrete metabolism to which it refers.
This dichotomy between factual and formal object led Bunge to propose a
theory of factual properties and natural classes because predicates of logic can-
not be equated with concrete properties and mathematical sets cannot be con-
fused with natural classes:
We now have a theory of properties, distinct from the theory of predicates,
and a theory of kinds, different from the algebra of sets. We can therefore
use without qualms the concepts of a property and a kind. The differences
between predicates and properties, and between sets and kinds, suffice to
ruin the ontological interpretations of logic and of set theory. There is no
reason to expect that pure mathematics is capable of disclosing, without
further ado, the structure of reality. (Bunge 1977, 3:150)
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Just as a mathematized physical theory cannot be assimilated to a mathemat-
ical theory, a mathematized ontological theory cannot be assimilated to a logical
or mathematical theory. Logic and mathematics have no ontological scope in
metascience. Only some philosophical, religious, and mystical doctrines give for-
mal sciences the power to account for the world without worrying about the fac-
tual sciences.
Once Bunge is in possession of the notion of concrete object, much of the pos-
tulates and definitions of his ontology are constructed using this notion. Here is
a partial list of these concepts: state, state space, nomic statement, natural class,
population, community and species, real existence, nothingness, real possibility
and necessity, disposition and propensity, change, event, process, space-time,
concrete system, level of organization. Thus, all these ontological concepts are
based on the notion of concrete object.
For example, it is not uncommon for a definition to start with “Let 𝑋 be a
thing. …”, or “If 𝑇 ⊆ 𝛩 is a set of concrete objects, then… ” (𝛩 being the set of all
concrete objects). Take for example definition 4.3 of fact:
Let 𝑋 be a thing. Then 𝑓 is a fact involving 𝑋 iff either
i) 𝑓  is a state of 𝑋 , i.e. there is a state space 𝑆𝕃(𝑋)  for 𝑋  such that
𝑓 = 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝕃(𝑋), or
ii) 𝑓 is a change of state of (or event in) 𝑋, i.e. there is an 𝑆𝕃(𝑋) such that
𝑓 = 𝑒 = 〈𝑠, 𝑠′〉 ∈ 𝑆𝕃(𝑋) × 𝑆𝕃(𝑋) (Bunge 1977, 3:169)
In other words, “a (real) fact is either the being of a thing in a given state, or
an event occurring in a thing” (Bunge 1977, 3:267). The notions of state and
change of state in point i) and ii) are defined in a similar way using the general
notion of a thing or concrete object. Examination of the other ontological notions
on which Bunge dwells only confirms the latter’s interest in the concrete object.
But not just any concrete object since the general notion of thing is supposed to
conform to more specific notions produced by the sciences, such as those of
physical field, atom, cell, person, society, etc. Bunge can be said to be interested
in the scientific object if we understand that this expression means the scientific
study of concrete objects, which are the same for scientists and everyone else.
Bunge is not interested in how we conceive the concrete object in everyday life,
although factual sciences such as psychology or sociology may be interested in
it. Common sense is not intended primarily to produce objective knowledge,
whereas it is this objective knowledge, produced by the factual sciences, which
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deserves to be studied in general. In other words, common knowledge cannot be
the subject of a general discourse because its concepts are not objective enough
or coherent enough and therefore cannot be generalized, while the objectivity of
scientific knowledge makes possible the existence of a scientific general dis-
course.
When we look at the definitions and assumptions of Ontology I and II, Bunge’s
ontology, unlike philosophical ontologies, is not intended to reveal a reality to
which the factual sciences would not have access. Not only does Bunge not assert
the existence of any conceptual, ideal or spiritual object, but it does not even as-
sert the existence of any concrete objects. It is the factual sciences that postulate
the existence of concrete objects, establish criteria for their existence, and de-
velop ways to study them.
3 METHODS OF ONTOLOGY
Bunge has hardly discussed his method of constructing semantic, ontological,
and epistemological theories, perhaps because for the author of the Treatise it is
obvious that there are no special faculties or special tools for theorizing science.
Bunge draws on the entire arsenal of cognitive faculties, starting with reflection9,
and does not a priori favor a mathematical formalism based on a philosophical
doctrine. Discussing the nature of the philosophy of science, its object, method,
and purpose, he argues:
The object should be real science (both natural and social), and the method
should be essentially the same as the method of science—since in either
case one tries to know something given. The goal should be to dismount
and then to reassemble the mechanism of science in order to expose its
structure, content, and functions. (Bunge 1973, 21)
And more particularly in the case of ontology:
Any means should be permitted in constructing a metaphysical theory as
long as it leads to a good theory: pinching from another field, analogizing,
extrapolating, looking for models of abstract theories, and of course invent-
ing radically new ones. Here, as in science and in mathematics, there is no
9 Ordinary or natural reflection, with which we are all endowed, and not philosophical reflection. Think-
ing, even in general, does not prove that we are philosophizing (Maurice 2020).
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royal road, and theories are judged by their works not by their scaffoldings.
(Bunge 1971, 509)
Thus, in terms of methods and techniques of analysis, Bunge practices meth-
odological conservatism and opportunism. Many philosophers, including Bunge,
make little or no use of the tools or methods of reflection and analysis recognized
by philosophers. These methods seem to cause more problems than they solve,
which may be why they are not used in formal and factual science. Here is there-
fore a non-exhaustive list of tools, methods and approaches, mainly associated
with philosophical doctrines and of which Bunge does not make use10: philo-
sophical counterfactuality, philosophical thought experiment, philosophical log-
ical analysis, philosophical conceptual analysis, philosophical linguistic analysis,
philosophical necessity and possibility, philosophical conceivability, philosoph-
ical intuition, dialectics, epoché, etc11.
Throughout his work Bunge has consistently criticized these approaches or
methods and has always denied the existence of special cognitive faculties nec-
essary for philosophical practice. It would be pointless to seek the Bungean
method, as it is customary for the great philosophers, the method then coming
to characterize the philosopher. In this way, a Platonist cannot surpass Plato, a
Cartesian cannot surpass Descartes and a Kantian cannot surpass Kant. The
method is inseparable from the philosopher. If you change the method a little
too much, you develop another philosophical doctrine. In Bunge’s case, a general
discourse about the world does not require a particular approach different from
what is practiced in any rational activity, whether in science, management, law,
education, health, etc. (Maurice 2020)
So we do not find in Bunge, for example, a distinction between what is onto-
logically, metaphysically or philosophically possible and what is factually, con-
cretely, materially, really or physically possible. Necessity and metaphysical pos-
sibility do not exist in Bunge, which implies that he does not resort to
philosophical methods to establish what would be philosophically or
10 We have to qualify most of the approaches listed as philosophical because most of them also have a
non-philosophical meaning.
11 For an overview of philosophical methods, see the Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology (Cap-
pelen, Gendler, and Hawthorne 2016) and the Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (Over-
gaard and D’Oro 2017).
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metaphysically necessary or possible12. This situation alone should convince an-
yone that Bunge’s ontological theories are not a matter of philosophy but of
metascience.
Cordero clearly noted the fundamental aspect of the Bungean approach: all
rational activity uses experience, reason, imagination and criticism (Cordero
2019, 94–96). Note that the experience, reason, and imagination in question
have no transcendent significance. In other words, it is about the experience of
the concrete world, including and especially the concrete world revealed by the
factual sciences, and of the use of reason and the imagination as natural faculties
and not as faculties which would give us access to a philosophical reality.
4 CONCLUSION
To understand the distinction between metascience and philosophy it is useful
to remember that we do not have direct access to reality, that there is no evi-
dence or general demonstration of the existence of things, that we must then
take for granted the existence of the “external world”, that there is no possible
answer to the question of the existence of one property rather than another. It
is through reflection and experience that we arrive at this conclusion (Maurice
2020).
Our representation of the world therefore involves the study of scientific re-
sults, which is the task of metascientific ontology. If we further believe that a
general discourse on science is valid, useful for the advancement of knowledge,
then we study science itself, which is devolved to metascientific semantics, epis-
temology, and methodology.
Bungean ontology therefore does not postulate the existence of any object
and does not use any philosophical method. If a discipline is characterized by its
objects and methods, then Bunge’s scientific ontology bears little resemblance
to philosophical ontologies. Bunge does not problematize science the way phi-
losophers do. In philosophical jargon, Bunge is a materialist, but his materialism
boils down to accepting concrete objects studied by the physical, chemical, bio-
logical and psychonological sciences. He therefore relies on science to determine
the furniture of the world. It is therefore abusive to reduce Bunge’s thought to a
12 Bunge distinguishes conceptual possibilities from real or factual possibilities, in accordance with his
methodological postulate of the dichotomy between concrete and conceptual objects. These notions of
possibility are discussed in Chapter 4 of Ontology I. It suffices to mention that the real possibilities depend
on the laws of nature, that is to say on the nomic relations that exist between properties.
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materialist doctrine insofar as even these doctrines, because they are philosoph-
ical, postulate the existence of objects and processes foreign to science and use
methods unknown to scientists. We don’t need materialist doctrines, we just
need to adopt the same general postulates as the sciences, analyze and interpret
their results, then abstract and generalize, all with the help of our natural facul-
ties. The role of Bungean ontology, but also of semantics, epistemology and
methodology, is similar to that of metalogic and metamathematics. And since the
scientific beast is just as complex as the logical beast or the mathematical beast,
it is not surprising that Bunge had to compose a treatise of nearly 2,400 pages to
lay the foundations of metascience13.
Bunge tells us in his autobiography that he had set himself the goal of linking
philosophy and science. In doing so he annihilated philosophy to produce a sci-
entific general discourse. This general discourse is designed for science and for
scientists, more precisely for metascientists, i.e., scientists interested in a gen-
eral discourse on the world and science. It is easy for any scientist interested in
a general discourse about science and about the world to understand Bunge’s
thought. Nothing he says is extravagant and nothing he does get off the track of
a normal research process. Because he summed up the spirit of the Bungean ap-
proach so well, let’s leave the final word to Joseph Agassi:
The idea behind the [Bungean] program is as commonsense as could be.
This may sound disappointing, as it lacks all extravagance, but then this is
what the program is all about. The idea is to stay well within one world […].
(Agassi 1990, 117)
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